We consider approval-based committee voting, i.e., the setting where each voter approves a subset of candidates, and these votes are then used to select a fixed-size set of winners (committee). We propose a natural axiom for this setting, which we call justified representation (JR). This axiom requires that if a large enough group of voters exhibits agreement by supporting the same candidate, then at least one voter in this group has an approved candidate in the winning committee. We show that for every list of ballots it is possible to select a committee that provides JR. We then check if this axiom is fulfilled by well-known approval-based voting rules. We show that the answer is negative for most of the rules we consider, with notable exceptions of PAV (Proportional Approval Voting), an extreme version of RAV (Reweighted Approval Voting), and, for a restricted preference domain, MAV (Minimax Approval Voting). We then introduce a stronger version of the JR axiom, which we call extended justified representation (EJR), and show that PAV satisfies EJR, while other rules do not. We also consider several other questions related to JR and EJR, including the relationship between JR/EJR and unanimity, and the complexity of the associated algorithmic problems.
Introduction
Aggregation of preferences is a central problem in the field of social choice, and has received a considerable amount of attention from the artificial intelligence research community (see e.g., Conitzer, 2010) . While the most-studied scenario is that of selecting a single candidate out of many, it is often the case that one needs to select a fixed-size set of winners (committee): this includes domains such as parliamentary elections, the hiring of faculty members, or (automated) agents deciding on a set of plans (Elkind, Lang, & Saffidine, 2011; LeGrand, Markakis, & Mehta, 2007; Davis, Orrison, & Su, 2014) . The study of algorithmic complexity of voting rules that output committees is an active research direction (see e.g., LeGrand et al., 2007; Meir, Procaccia, Rosenschein, & Zohar, 2008; Caragiannis, Kalaitzis, & Markakis, 2010; Lu & Boutilier, 2011; Betzler, Slinko, & Uhlmann, 2013; Skowron, Faliszewski, & Slinko, 2013a; Cornaz, Galand, & Spanjaard, 2012; Skowron, Yu, Faliszewski, & Elkind, 2013b) .
Much of the prior work on properties of multi-winner rules focuses on the setting where voters' preferences are total orders of the candidates. In contrast, in this paper we focus on approval-based rules, where each voter lists the subset of candidates that she approves of. One of the advantages of such rules is the simplicity of ballots: approval ballots reduce the cognitive burden on voters (rather than providing a full ranking of the candidates, a voter only needs to decide which candidates to approve) and are also easier to communicate to the election authority. The most straightforward way to aggregate approvals is to have every approval for a candidate contribute one point to that candidate's score and select the candidates with the highest score. This rule is called Approval Voting (AV ). AV has many desirable properties in the single winner case (Brams, Kilgour, & Sanver, 2006; Endriss, 2013) , including its "simplicity, propensity to elect Condorcet winners (when they exist), its robustness to manipulation and its monotonicity" (Brams, 2010, p. viii) . However, for the case of multiple winners, the merits of AV are "less clear" (Brams, 2010, p. viii) . In particular, for the multi-winner case, AV does not address concerns such as proportional representation: if the goal is to select k winners, 51% of the agents approve the same k candidates, and the remaining agents approve a disjoint set of k candidates, then the agents in minority do not get any of their approved candidates selected.
As a consequence, over the years, several multi-winner rules based on approval ballots have been proposed (see e.g., Kilgour, 2010) . Under Proportional Approval Voting (PAV ), each agent's contribution to the committee's total score depends on how many candidates from the agent's approval set have been elected. A sequential variant of this rule is known as Reweighted Approval Voting (RAV ) . Another way to modulate the approvals is through computing a satisfaction score for each agent based on the ratio of the number of their approved candidates appearing in the committee and their total number of approved candidates; this idea leads to Satisfaction Approval Voting (SAV ) . One could also use a distance-based approach: Minimax Approval Voting (MAV ) selects a set of k candidates that minimizes the maximum Hamming distance from the submitted ballots. All the rules informally described above have a more egalitarian objective than AV . For example, Steven Brams, the main proponent of AV in single-winner elections, has argued that SAV is more suitable for more equitable representation in multi-winner elections (Brams & Kilgour, 2014) .
Based on their relative merits, approval-based multi-winner rules have been examined in great detail in both economics and computer science literature in recent years (Brams & Fishburn, 2007; LeGrand et al., 2007; Meir et al., 2008; Caragiannis et al., 2010) . The Handbook of Approval Voting discusses various approval-based multi-winner rules including PAV , RAV , SAV and MAV (Kilgour, 2010). However, there has been limited axiomatic analysis of these rules from the perspective of representation.
In this paper, we introduce and investigate the notion of justified representation (JR) in approval-based voting. Briefly, a committee is said to provide justified representation for a given set of ballots if every large enough group of voters with shared preferences is allocated at least one representative. A rule is said to satisfy justified representation if it always outputs a committee that provides justified representation. This concept is related to the Droop proportionality criterion (Droop, 1881 ) and Dummett's solid coalition property (Dummett, 1984; Tideman & Richardson, 2000; Elkind, Faliszewski, Skowron, & Slinko, 2014) , but is specific to approval-based elections. A somewhat similar notion of representativeness was recenty proposed by Duddy (2014) ; however, justified representation does not imply representativeness and, conversely, representativeness does not imply justified representation.
We show that every set of ballots admits a committee that provides justified representation; moreover, such a committee can be computed efficiently, and checking whether a given committee provides JR can be done in polynomial time as well. This shows that justified representation is a reasonable requirement. However, it turns out that very few of the existing multi-winner approval-based rules satisfy it. Specifically, we demonstrate that AV , SAV , MAV and the standard variant of RAV do not satisfy JR. On the positive side, JR is satisfied by PAV and some of its variants, as well as an extreme variant of RAV . Also, MAV satisfies JR for a restricted type of voters' preferences. We then consider a strengthening of the JR axiom, which we call extended justified representation (EJR). This axiom captures the intuition that a very large group of voters with similar preferences may deserve not just one, but several representatives. EJR turns out to be a more demanding property than JR: of all voting rules considered in this paper, only PAV satisfies EJR. Moreover, it is computationally hard to check whether a given committee provides EJR. We also consider another strengthening of JR, which we call strong justified representation (SJR); however, it turns out that for some inputs SJR is impossible to achieve. We conclude the paper by showing how JR can be used to formulate other attractive approval-based multi-winner rules, and by identifying several directions for future work.
Preliminaries
We consider a social choice setting with a set of agents (voters) N = {1, . . . , n} and a set of candidates C = {c 1 , . . . , c m }. Each agent i ∈ N submits an approval ballot A i ⊆ C, which represents the subset of candidates that she approves of. We refer to the list A = (A 1 , . . . , A n ) of approval ballots as the ballot profile. We will consider approval-based multi-winner voting rules that take as input (N, C, A, k), where k is a positive integer that satisfies k ≤ |C|, and return a subset W ⊆ C of size k, which we call the winning set, or committee (Kilgour & Marshall, 2012) . We omit N and C from the notation when they are clear from the context. Several such rules are defined below. Whenever the description of the rule does not uniquely specify a winning set, we assume that ties are broken according to a fixed priority order over size-k subsets; however, most of our results do not depend on the tiebreaking rule. Approval Voting (AV) Under AV , the winners are the k candidates that receive the largest number of approvals. Formally, the approval score of a candidate c ∈ C is defined as |{i | c ∈ A i }|, and AV outputs a set W of size k that maximizes c∈W |{i | c ∈ A i }|. AV has been adopted by several academic and professional societies such as the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Satisfaction Approval Voting (SAV) An agent's satisfaction score is the fraction of her approved candidates that are elected. SAV maximizes the sum of agents' satisfaction scores. Formally, SAV finds a set W ⊆ C of size k that maximizes i∈N |W ∩A i | |A i | . The rule was proposed with the aim of "representing more diverse interests" than AV (Brams & Kilgour, 2014) . Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) Under PAV , an agent is assumed to derive a utility of 1 + 1 2 + 1 3 + · · · + 1 j from a committee that contains exactly j of her approved candidates, and the goal is to maximize the sum of the agents' utilities. Formally, the PAV -score of a set W ⊆ C is defined as i∈N r(|W ∩ A i |), where r(p) = p j=1 1 j , and PAV outputs a set W ⊆ C of size k with the highest PAV -score. PAV was proposed by mathematician Forest Simmons in 2001, and captures the idea of diminishing returns-an individual agent's preferences should count less the more she is satisfied. It has recently been shown that computing PAV is NP-hard (Aziz, Gaspers, Gudmundsson, Mackenzie, Mattei, & Walsh, 2014) . We can generalize the definition of PAV by using an arbitrary non-increasing score vector in place of (1, 1 2 , 1 3 , . . . ): for every vector w = (w 1 , w 2 , . . . ), where w 1 , w 2 , . . . are non-negative reals 1 , w 1 = 1 and w 1 ≥ w 2 ≥ . . . , we define a voting rule w-PAV that, given a ballot profile (A 1 , . . . , A n ) and a target number of winners k, returns a set W of size k with the highest w-PAV score, defined by i∈N r w (|W ∩ A i |), where r w (p) = p j=1 w j . Reweighted Approval Voting (RAV) RAV converts AV into a multi-round rule, by selecting a candidate in each round and then reweighing the approvals for the subsequent rounds. Specifically, it starts by setting W = ∅. Then in round j, j = 1, . . . , k, it computes the approval weight of each candidate c as
selects a candidate with the highest approval weight, and adds him to W . RAV was invented by the Danish polymath Thorvald Thiele in the early 1900's. RAV has also been referred to as "sequential proportional AV" (Brams & Kilgour, 2014) , and was used briefly in Sweden during the early 1900's. Just as for PAV , we can extend the definition of RAV to score vectors other than (1, 1 2 , 1 3 , . . . ): every vector w = (w 1 , w 2 , . . . ) with w 1 = 1 and w 1 ≥ w 2 ≥ . . . defines a sequential voting rule w-RAV , which proceeds as RAV , except that it computes the approval weight of a candidate c in round j as i:c∈A i w |W ∩A i |+1 , where W is the winning set after the first j − 1 rounds.
Minimax Approval Voting (MAV)
MAV returns a committee W that minimizes the maximum Hamming distance between W and the agents' ballots. Formally, let d(Q, T ) = |Q \ T | + |T \ Q| and define the MAV -score of a set W ⊆ C as max (d(W, A 1 ), . . . , d(W, A n )). MAV outputs a size-k set with the lowest MAVscore. Minimax approval voting was proposed by Brams, Kilgour, and Sanver (2007) . Computing the outcome of MAV is known to be NP-hard (LeGrand et al., 2007) .
Justified Representation
We will now define the main concept of this paper.
Definition 1 (Justified representation (JR)) Given a ballot profile (A 1 , . . . , A n ) over a candidate set C and a target committee size k, k ≤ |C|, we say that a set of candidates W of size |W | = k provides justified representation for (A, k) if there does not exist a set of voters N * ⊆ N with |N * | ≥ n k such that i∈N * A i = ∅ and A i ∩ W = ∅ for all i ∈ N * . We say that an approval-based voting rule satisfies justified representation (JR) if for every profile A = (A 1 , . . . , A n ) and every target committee size k it outputs a winning set that provides justified representation for (A, k).
The intuition behind this definition is that if k candidates are to be selected, then a set of n k voters that are completely unrepresented can demand that at least one of their unanimously approved candidates should be selected.
Existence and Computational Properties
We start our analysis of justified representation by observing that, for every ballot profile A and every value of k, there is a committee that provides justified representation for (A, k), and, moreover, such a committee can be computed efficiently given the voters' ballots.
Theorem 1 There exists a polynomial-time algorithm that, given a ballot profile A = (A 1 , . . . , A n ) over a candidate set C, and a target committee size k, k ≤ |C|, outputs a set of candidates W such that |W | = k and W provides justified representation for (A, k).
Proof: Consider the following greedy algorithm, which we will refer to as Greedy Approval Voting (GAV ). We start by setting C ′ = C, A ′ = A, and W = ∅. As long as |W | < k and A ′ is non-empty, we pick a candidate c ∈ C ′ that has the highest approval score with respect to A ′ , and set W := W ∪ {c}, C ′ := C ′ \ {c}. Also, we remove from A ′ all ballots A i such that c ∈ A i . If at some point we have |W | < k and A ′ is empty, we add an arbitrary set of k − |W | candidates from C ′ to W and return W ; if this does not happen, we terminate after having picked k candidates.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that for some k > 0 and some ballot profile A = (A 1 , . . . , A n ), GAV outputs a committee that does not provide justified representation for (A, k). Then there exists a set N * ⊆ N with |N * | ≥ n k such that i∈N * A i = ∅ and, when GAV terminates, every ballot A i such that i ∈ N * is still in A ′ . Consider some candidate c ∈ i∈N * A i . At every point in the execution of GAV , c's approval score is at least |N * | ≥ n k . As c was not elected, at every stage the algorithm selected a candidate whose approval score was at least as high as that of c. Since at the end of each stage the algorithm removed from A ′ all ballots containing the candidate added to W at that stage, altogether the algorithm has removed at least k · n k ballots from A ′ . This contradicts the assumption that A ′ contains at least n k ballots when the algorithm terminates. ✷ Theorem 1 shows that it is easy to find a committee that provides justified representation for a given ballot profile. It is also not too hard to check whether a given committee W provides JR. Indeed, while it may seem that we need to consider every subset of voters of size n k , in fact it is sufficient to consider the candidates one by one, and, for each candidate c, compute s(c) = |{i ∈ N | c ∈ A i , A i ∩ W = ∅}|; the set W fails to provide justified representation for (A, k) if and only if there exists a candidate c with s ≥ n k . Thus, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 2 There exists a polynomial-time algorithm that, given a ballot profile A over a candidate set C, and a committee W , |W | = k, decides whether W provides justified representation for (A, k).
JR and Unanimity
Another desirable property of approval-based voting rules is unanimity: we say that an approval-based rule is unanimous if, given a ballot profile (A 1 , . . . , A n ) with i∈N A i = ∅ and a target committee size k, it outputs a winning set W , |W | = k, such that W ∩ i∈N A i = ∅. While unanimity may appear to be similar to JR, the two properties are essentially unrelated. Specifically, for k = 1 unanimity implies JR (to see this, note that the only way to violate JR for k = 1 is to select a candidate that is not approved by any of the voters when there exists a candidate that is approved by all voters), but for k > 1 this is not the case.
On this profile, every voting rule that provides JR outputs a set W with W ∩ A i = ∅ for i = 1, . . . , k. However, a unanimous rule may behave arbitrarily.
The following example shows that JR does not imply unanimity either; note that it works even for k = 1.
Consider a voting rule that outputs {b 1 , . . . , b k } on this profile, and coincides with GAV on every other profile. Clearly, this rule is not unanimous, but it is impossible to find a group of n k = 2 unrepresented voters for (A 1 , . . . , A k , A k+1 ).
JR under Approval-based Rules
We have argued that justified representation is a reasonable condition: there always exists a committee that provides it, and, moreover, such a committee can be computed efficiently. It is therefore natural to ask whether prominent voting rules satisfy JR. In this section, we will answer this question for AV , SAV , MAV , PAV , and RAV , as well as identify conditions on w that are sufficient/necessary for w-PAV and w-RAV to satisfy JR.
In what follows, for each rule we will try to identify the range of values of k for which this rule satisfies JR. Trivially, all considered rules satisfy JR for k = 1. It turns out that AV fails JR for k > 2, and for k = 2 the answer depends on the tie-breaking rule.
Theorem 5 For k = 2, AV satisfies JR if ties are broken in favor of sets that provide JR. For k ≥ 3, AV fails JR.
Proof: Suppose first that k = 2. Fix a ballot profile A. If every candidate is approved by less than n 2 voters in A, JR is trivially satisfied. If some candidate is approved by more than n 2 voters in A, then AV selects some such candidate, in which case no group of ⌈ n 2 ⌉ voters is unrepresented, so JR is satisfied in this case as well. It remains to consider the case where n = 2n ′ , some candidates are approved by n ′ voters, and no candidate is approved by more than n ′ voters. Then AV necessarily picks at least one candidate approved by n ′ voters; denote this candidate by c. In this situation JR can only be violated if the n ′ voters who do not approve c all approve the same candidate (say, c ′ ), and this candidate is not elected. But the approval score of c ′ is n ′ , and, by our assumption, the approval score of every candidate is at most n ′ , so this is a contradiction with our tie-breaking rule. This argument also illustrates why the assumption on the tie-breaking rule is necessary: it can be the case that n ′ voters approve c and c ′′ , and the remaining n ′ voters approve c ′ , in which case the approval score of {c, c ′′ } is the same as that of {c, c ′ }.
For k ≥ 3, we let C = {c 0 , c 1 , . . . , c k }, n = k, and consider the profile where the first voter approves c 0 , whereas each of the remaining voters approves all of c 1 , . . . , c k . JR requires c 0 to be selected, but AV selects {c 1 , . . . , c k }. ✷
In contrast, SAV and MAV fail JR even for k = 2.
Theorem 6 SAV and MAV do not satisfy JR for k ≥ 2.
Therefore, the first voter will remain unrepresented.
For MAV , we use the following construction.
Every committee of size k that provides JR for this profile contains z. However, MAV fails to select z. Indeed, the MAV -score of X is k + 1:
Thus, MAV prefers X to any committee that includes z. ✷
The constructions used in the proof of Theorem 6 show that MAV and SAV may behave very differently: SAV appears to favor voters who approve very few candidates, whereas MAV appears to favor voters who approve many candidates. Interestingly, we can show that MAV satisfies JR if we assume that each agent approves exactly k candidates and ties are broken in favor of sets that provide justified representation.
Theorem 7 If the target committee size is k, |A i | = k for all i ∈ N , and ties are broken in favor of sets that provide JR, then MAV satisfies JR.
Proof: Consider a profile
Observe that if there exists a set of candidates W with |W | = k such that W ∩ A i = ∅ for all i ∈ N , then MAV will necessarily select some such set. Indeed, for any such set W we have d(W,
Further, by definition, every set W such that |W | = k and W ∩ A i = ∅ for all i ∈ N provides justified representation for (A, k).
On the other hand, if there is no k-element set of candidates that intersects each A i , i ∈ N , then the MAV -score of every set of size k is 2k, and therefore MAV can pick an arbitrary size-k subset. Since we assumed that the tie-breaking rule favors sets that provide JR, our claim follows. ✷ While Theorem 7 provides an example of a setting where a well-known voting rule satisfies JR, this result is not entirely satisfactory: first, we had to place a strong restriction on voters' preferences, and, second, we used a tie-breaking rule that was tailored to JR. In contrast, we will now show that another common voting rule, namely, PAV satisfies JR for all ballot profiles and irrespective of the tiebreaking rule.
Theorem 8 PAV satisfies JR.
Proof: Fix a ballot profile A = (A 1 , . . . , A n ) and a k > 0 and let s = ⌈ n k ⌉. Let W be the output of PAV on (A, k). Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there exists a set N * ⊂ N ,
Let c be some candidate approved by all voters in N * .
For each candidate w ∈ W , define its marginal contribution as the difference between the PAV -score of W and that of W \ {w}. Let m(W ) denote the sum of marginal contributions of all candidates in W . Observe that if c were to be added to the winning set, this would increase the PAV -score by at least s. Therefore, it suffices to argue that the marginal contribution of some candidate in W is less than s: this would mean that swapping this candidate with c increases the PAV -score, a contradiction. To this end, we will prove that m(W ) ≤ s(k − 1); as |W | = k, our claim would then follow by the pigeonhole principle.
Consider the set N \ N * ; we have n ≤ sk, so |N \ N * | ≤ n − s ≤ s(k − 1). Pick a voter i ∈ N \ N * , and let j = |A i ∩ W |. If j > 0, this voter contributes exactly 1 j to the marginal contribution of each candidate in A i ∩ W , and hence her contribution to m(W ) is exactly 1. If j = 0, this voter does not contribute to m(W ) at all. Therefore, we have m(W ) ≤ |N \ N * | ≤ s(k − 1), which is what we wanted to prove. ✷
The reader may observe that the proof of Theorem 8 applies to all voting rules of the form w-PAV where the weight vector satisfies w j ≤ 1 j for all j ≥ 1. In Section 4 we will see that this condition on w is also necessary for w-PAV to satisfy JR. (see Lemma 1 in the proof of Theorem 13).
Next, we consider RAV . As this voting rule can be viewed as a tractable approximation of PAV (recall that PAV is NP-hard to compute), one could expect that RAV satisfies JR as well. However, this turns out not to be the case, at least if k is sufficiently large.
Theorem 9 RAV satisfies JR for k = 2, but fails it for k ≥ 10.
Proof: For k = 2, we can use essentially the same argument as for AV (see the proof of Theorem 5); however, we do not need to assume anything about the tiebreaking rule. Indeed, just as in that proof, we only have to worry about the case where n = 2n ′ , no candidate is approved by more than n ′ voters, some candidate c is approved by n ′ voters, another candidate c ′ is approved by a disjoint set of n ′ voters, and RAV picks c in the first round. But then the RAV -score of c ′ in the second round is n ′ , and the only other candidates with this score are approved by the same group of n ′ voters, so one of them will necessarily be selected, irrespective of the tie-breaking rule. Now, suppose that k = 10. Consider a profile over a candidate set C = {c 1 , . . . , c 11 } with 1199 voters who submit the following ballots:
Candidates c 1 and c 4 are each approved by 162 voters, the most of any candidate and these voters' approvals do not overlap, so RAV selects c 1 and c 4 first. This reduces the RAV scores of c 2 , c 3 , c 5 and c 6 from 80+81 = 161 to 80+40.5 = 120.5, so c 7 , whose RAV score is 147, is selected next. Now, the RAV scores of c 8 , c 9 and c 10 become 96 + 24.5 = 120.5. The selection of any of c 2 , c 3 , c 5 , c 6 , c 8 , c 9 or c 10 does not affect the RAV score of the others, so all seven of these candidates will be selected before c 11 , who has 120 approvals. Thus, after the selection of 10 candidates, there are 120 > 1199 10 = n k unrepresented voters who jointly approve c 11 .
To extend this construction to k > 10, we create k − 10 additional candidates and 120(k − 10) additional voters such that for each new candidate, there are 120 new voters who approve that candidate only. Note that we still have 120 > n k . RAV will proceed to select c 1 , . . . , c 10 , followeed by k − 10 additional candidates, and c 11 or one of the new candidates will remain unselected. ✷ While RAV itself fails JR, one could hope that this can be fixed by modifying the weights, i.e., that w-RAV satisfies JR for a suitable weight vector w. However, Theorem 9 can be extended to w-RAV for every weight vector w such that w 2 > 0.
Theorem 10 For every vector w = (w 1 , w 2 , . . . ) with w 2 > 0, there exists a value of k 0 > 0 such that w-RAV does not satisfy JR for k > k 0 .
where C 1 = {c i,j | i = 1, . . . , 2s + 3, j = 1, . . . , 2s + 1},
For each i = 1, . . . , 2s + 3 and each j = 1, . . . , 2s + 1 we construct 2s 3 − s voters who approve c i,j only and s 2 voters who approve c i,j and c i only. Finally, we construct 2s 3 −1 voters who approve x only and s 2 −7s−5 voters who approve y only (note that the number of voters who approve y is positive by our choice of s). Set k 0 = (2s + 2)(2s + 3) = |C 1 ∪ C 2 |. Note that the number of voters n is given by (2s + 3)(2s + 1)(2s 3 + s 2 − s) + (2s 3 − 1) + (s 2 − 7s − 5) = (2s + 2)(2s + 3)(2s 3 − 1) = (2s 3 − 1)k 0 , and hence n k 0 = 2s 3 − 1. Under w-RAV initially the score of each candidate in C 2 is s 2 (2s + 1) = 2s 3 + s 2 , the score of each candidate in C 1 is 2s 3 + s 2 − s, the score of x is 2s 3 − 1, and the score of y is s 2 − 7s − 5, so in the first 2s + 3 rounds the candidates from C 2 get elected. After that, the score of every candidate in C 1 becomes 2s 3 − s + w 2 s 2 ≥ 2s 3 − s + s = 2s 3 , while the scores of x and y remains unchanged. Therefore, in the next (2s + 3)(2s + 1) rounds the candidates from C 1 get elected. At this point, k candidates are elected, and x is not elected, even though the 2s 3 − 1 = n k 0 voters who approve him do not approve of any of the candidates in the winning set.
To extend this argument to larger values of k, we proceed as in the proof of Theorem 9: for k > k 0 , we add k − k 0 new candidates, and for each new candidate we construct 2s 3 − 1 new voters who approve that candidate only. Let the resulting number of voters be n ′ ; we have n ′ k = 2s 3 − 1, so w-RAV will first select the candidates in C 2 , followed by the candidates in C 1 , and then it will choose k − k 0 winners among the new candidates and x. As a result, either x or one of the new candidates will remain unselected. ✷ Remark 1 Theorem 10 partially subsumes Theorem 9: it implies that RAV fails JR, but the proof only shows that this is the case for k ≥ 18 · 19 = 342, while Theorem 9 states that RAV fails JR for k ≥ 10 already. We chose to include the proof of Theorem 9 because we feel that it is useful to know what happens for relatively small values of k. We remark that it remains an open problem whether RAV satisfies JR for k = 3, . . . , 9.
As we require w 1 ≥ w 2 ≥ . . . , the only weight vector not captured by Theorem 10 is (1, 0, . . . , 0) . In fact, (1, 0, . . . , 0) -RAV satisfies JR: indeed, this rule is exactly the greedy rule GAV ! We can extend this result somewhat, by allowing the entries of the weight vector to depend on the number of voters n: the argument used to show that GAV satisfies JR extends to w-RAV where the weight vector w satisfies w 2 ≤ 1 n . In particular, the rule (1, 1 n , 1 n 2 , . . . , )-RAV is somewhat more appealing than GAV : for instance, if i∈N A i = {c} and k > 1, GAV will pick c, and then behave arbitrarily, whereas (1, 1 n , 1 n 2 , . . . , )-RAV will also pick c, but then it will continue to look for candidates approved by as many voters as possible.
Extended Justified Representation
We have identified two families of voting rules that satisfy JR for arbitrary ballot profiles: w-PAV with w j ≤ 1 j (this includes the PAV rule) and w-RAV with w 2 ≤ 1 n (this includes the GAV rule). The obvious advantage of the greedy rule is that its output can be computed efficiently, whereas computing the output of PAV in NP-hard. However, arguably, GAV puts too much emphasis on representing every voter, at the expense of ensuring that large sets of voters with shared preferences are allocated an adequate number of representatives. For instance, if k = 3, there are 98 voters who approve a and b, while c and d are each approved by a single voter, the greedy rule would include both c and d in the winning set, whereas in many settings it would be more reasonable to choose both a and b (and one of c and d).
This issue is not addressed by the JR axiom, as it does not care if a given voter is represented by one or more candidates. Thus, if we want to capture the intuition that large cohesive groups of voters should be allocated several representatives, we need a stronger condition. Recall that JR says that each group of n k voters that all approve the same candidate "deserves" at least one representative. It seems reasonable to scale this idea and say that, for every ℓ > 0, each group of ℓ · n k voters that all approve the same ℓ candidates "deserves" at least ℓ representatives. This approach can be formalized as follows. Extended justified representation (EJR) ) Consider a ballot profile A = (A 1 , . . . , A n ) over a candidate set C, a target committee size k, k ≤ |C|, and a positive integer ℓ, ℓ ≤ k. We say that a set of candidates W , |W | = k, provides ℓ-justified representation for (A, k) if there does not exist a set of voters N * ⊆ N with |N * | ≥ ℓ · n k such that | i∈N * A i | ≥ ℓ, but |A i ∩ W | < ℓ for each i ∈ N * ; we say that W provides extended justified representation (EJR) for (A, k) if it provides ℓ-JR for (A, k) for all ℓ, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k. We say that an approval-based voting rule satisfies ℓ-justified representation (ℓ-JR) if for every profile A = (A 1 , . . . , A n ) and every target committee size k it outputs a committee that provides ℓ-JR for (A, k) . Finally, we say that a rule satisfies extended justified representation (EJR) if it satisfies ℓ-JR for all ℓ, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k.
Definition 2 (
Observe that 1-JR is simply JR. However, EJR is not implied by JR: this is illustrated by the 4-candidate 100-voter example earlier in this section. Further, although EJR is stronger than JR, it still does not imply unanimity; this follows from Example 4 in Section 3.
EJR under Approval-based Rules
It is natural to ask which of the voting rules that satisfy JR also satisfy EJR. Our 4-voter 100-candidate example immediately shows that for GAV the answer is negative. Consequently, no w-RAV rule such that the entries of w do not depend on n satisfies EJR: if w 2 = 0, this rule is GAV , and if w 2 > 0, this follows from Theorem 10.
The next example shows that MAV fails EJR even if each voter approves exactly k candidates (recall that under this assumption MAV satisfies JR).
Example 11 Let k = 4, C = C 1 ∪ C 2 ∪ C 3 ∪ C 4 , where |C 1 | = |C 2 | = |C 3 | = |C 4 | = 4 and the sets C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 are pairwise disjoint. Let A = (A 1 , . . . , A 8 ), where A i = C i for i = 1, 2, 3, and A i = C 4 for i = 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. MAV will select exactly one candidate from each of the sets C 1 , C 2 , C 3 and C 4 , but EJR dictates that at least two candidates from C 4 are chosen.
It remains to consider PAV .
Theorem 12 PAV satisfies EJR.
Proof: Suppose that PAV violates EJR for some value of k, and consider a ballot profile A 1 , . . . , A n , a value of ℓ > 0 and a set of voters N * , |N * | = s ≥ ℓ · n k , that witness this. Let W , |W | = k, be the winning set. We know that at least one of the ℓ candidates approved by all voters in N * is not elected; let c be some such candidate. Each voter in N * has at most ℓ−1 representatives in W , so the marginal contribution of c (if it were to be added to W ) would be at least s · 1 ℓ ≥ n k . On the other hand, the argument in the proof of Theorem 8 can me modified to show that the sum of marginal contributions of candidates in W is at most n. Now, consider some candidate w ∈ W with the smallest marginal contribution; clearly, his marginal contribution is at most n k . If it is strictly less than n k , we are done, as we can improve the total PAV -score by swapping w and c, a contradiction.
Therefore suppose it is exactly n k , and therefore the marginal contribution of each candidate in W is exactly n k . Since PAV satisfies JR, we know that A i ∩W = ∅ for some i ∈ N * . Pick some candidate w ′ ∈ W ∩ A i , and set W ′ = (W \ {w ′ }) ∪ {c}. Observe that after w ′ is removed, adding c increases the total PAV -score by at least (s − 1) · 1 ℓ + 1 ℓ−1 > n k . Indeed, i approves at most ℓ − 2 candidates in W \ {w ′ } and therefore adding c to W \ {w ′ } contributes at least 1 ℓ−1 to her satisfaction. Thus, the PAV -score of W ′ is higher than that of W , a contradiction again. ✷ Interestingly, Theorem 12 does not extend to weight vectors other than (1, 1 2 , 1 3 , . . . ): our next theorem shows that PAV is the unique w-PAV rule that satisfies EJR.
Theorem 13 For every weight vector w with w = (1, 1 2 , 1 3 , . . . ), the rule w-PAV does not satisfy EJR.
Theorem 13 follows immediately from Lemmas 1 and 2, which are stated and proved below.
Lemma 1 Consider a weight vector w. If w j > 1 j for some j > 1, then w-PAV fails JR.
Proof: Suppose that w j = 1 j + ε for some j > 1 and ε > 0. Pick k > ⌈ 1 εj ⌉ + 1 so that j divides k; let t = k j . Let C = C 0 ∪ C 1 ∪ · · · ∪ C t , where C 0 = {c}, |C 1 | = · · · = |C t | = j, and the sets C 0 , C 1 , . . . , C t are pairwise disjoint. Note that |C| = tj + 1 = k + 1. Also, construct t + 1 pairwise disjoint groups of voters N 0 , N 1 , . . . , N t so that |N 0 | = k, |N 1 | = · · · = |N t | = j(k − 1), and for each i = 0, 1, . . . , t the voters in N i approve the candidates in C i only. Observe that the total number of voters is given by n = k + tj(k − 1) = k 2 .
We have |N 0 | = k = n k , so every committee that provides justified representation for this profile must elect c. However, we claim that w-PAV elects all candidates in C \{c} instead. Indeed, if we replace an arbitrary candidate in C \{c} with c, then under w-PAV the total score of our committee changes by
i.e., C \ {c} has a strictly higher score than any committee that includes c. ✷ Lemma 2 Consider a weight vector w. If w j < 1 j for some j > 1, then w-PAV fails j-JR.
Proof: Suppose that w j = 1 j − ε for some j > 1 and ε > 0. Pick k > j + ⌈ 1 ε ⌉.
Note that |C| = k + 1. Also, construct k − j + 2 pairwise disjoint groups of voters N 0 , N 1 , . . . , N k−j+1 so that |N 0 | = j(k − j + 1), |N 1 | = · · · = |N k−j+1 | = k − j, the voters in N 0 approve the candidates in C 0 only, and for each i = 1, . . . , k−j+1 the voters in N i approve c i only. Note that the number of voters is given by n = j(k − j + 1) + (k − j + 1)(k − j) = k(k − j + 1).
We have n k = k − j + 1 and |N 0 | = j · n k , so every committee that provides EJR must select all candidates in C 0 . However, we claim that w-PAV elects all candidates from C 1 and j − 1 candidates from C 0 instead. Indeed, let c be some candidate in C 0 , let c ′ be some candidate in C 1 , and let W = C \ {c}, W ′ = C \ {c ′ }. The difference between the total score of W and that of W ′ is
i.e., w-PAV assigns a higher score to W . As this argument does not depend of the choice of c in C 0 and c ′ in C 1 , the proof is complete. ✷
Computational Issues
In Section 3 we have argued that it is easy to find a committee that provides JR for a given ballot profile, and to check whether a specific committee provides JR. In contrast, for EJR these questions appear to be computationally difficult. Specifically, we were unable to design an efficient algorithm for computing a committee that provides EJR; while PAV is guaranteed to find such a committee, computing its output is NP-hard. For the problem of checking whether a given committee provides EJR for a given input, we can establish a formal hardness result.
Theorem 14 Given a ballot profile A, a target committee size k, and a committee W , |W | = k, it is coNP-complete to check whether W provides EJR for (A, k).
Proof: It is easy to see that this problem is in coNP: to show that W does not provide EJR for (A, k), it suffices to guess an integer ℓ and a set of voters N * of size at least ℓ · n k such that | i∈N * A i | ≥ ℓ, but |A i ∩ W | < ℓ for all i ∈ N * . To prove coNP-completeness, we reduce the classic BALANCED BICLIQUE problem (Garey & Johnson, 1979, Problem GT24) to the complement of our problem. An instance of BALANCED BICLIQUE is given by a bipartite graph (L, R, E) with parts L and R and edge set E, and an integer ℓ; it is a "yes"-instance if we can pick subsets of vertices L ′ ⊆ L and R ′ ⊆ R so that |L ′ | = |R ′ | = ℓ and (u, v) ∈ E for each u ∈ L ′ , v ∈ R ′ ; otherwise, it is a "no"-instance.
Fix an instance (L, R, E), ℓ of BALANCED BICLIQUE with R = {v 1 , . . . , v s }. We create an instance of our problem as follows. Assume without loss of generality that s ≥ 3, ℓ ≥ 3. We construct 4 pairwise disjoint sets of candidates C 0 ,
We then construct 3 sets of voters N 0 , N 1 , N 2 , so that
The candidates in C 2 are matched to voters in N 2 : each voter in N 2 approves exactly one candidate in C 2 , and each candidate in C 2 is approved by exactly one voter in N 2 . Denote the resulting list of ballots by A. Finally, we set k = 2ℓ − 2, and let W = C 1 ∪ C ′ 1 . Note that the number of voters n is given by s + ℓ(s − 1) + sℓ + ℓ − 3s = 2s(ℓ − 1), so n k = s. Suppose first that we started with a "yes"-instance of BALANCED BICLIQUE, and let (L ′ , R ′ ) be the respective ℓ-by-ℓ biclique. Let C * = L ′ , N * = N 0 ∪ N 1 . Then |N * | = ℓs, all voters in N * approve all candidates in C * , |C * | = ℓ, but each voter in N * is only represented by ℓ − 1 candidates in W . Hence, W fails to provide ℓ-justified representation for (A, k).
Conversely, suppose that W fails to provide EJR for (A, k). That is, there exists a value j > 0, a set N * of js voters and a set C * of j candidates so that all voters in N * approve of all candidates in C * , but for each voter in N * at most j of her approved candidates are in W . Note that, since s > 1, we have N * ∩ N 2 = ∅. Further, each voter in N \ N 2 is represented by ℓ − 1 candidates in W , so j ≥ ℓ. As N * = js ≥ ℓs ≥ s, it follows that |N * ∩ N 0 | ≥ ℓ, |N * ∩ N 1 | > 0. Since N * contains voters from both N 0 and N 1 , it follows that C * ⊆ C 0 . Thus, there are at least ℓ voters in N * ∩ N 0 who approve the same j ≥ ℓ candidates in C 0 ; any set of ℓ such voters and ℓ such candidates corresponds to an ℓ-by-ℓ biclique in the input graph. ✷ However, we can modify the algorithm described in the proof of Theorem 1 to verify whether a given committee provides ℓ-JR for a fixed value of ℓ.
Theorem 15 For fixed ℓ, a committee satisfying ℓ-JR can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof: Consider the following greedy algorithm, which we will refer to as ℓ-GAV . We start by setting C ′ = C, A ′ = A, and W = ∅. As long as |W | ≤ k − ℓ, we pick a set of candidates {c 1 , . . . , c ℓ } ⊂ C ′ that is unanimously approved by at least ℓ n k ballots in A ′ (if such a set of candidates exists), and set W := W ∪ {c 1 , . . . , c ℓ }. Also, we remove from A ′ all ballots A i such that |A i ∩ W | ≥ ℓ (note that this includes ballots A i with {c 1 , . . . c ℓ } ⊆ A i ). If at some point we have |W | ≤ k − ℓ and there is no {c 1 , . . . , c ℓ } that can be added to W , or |W | > k − ℓ, we add an arbitrary k − |W | candidates from C ′ to W and return W ; if this does not happen, we terminate after having picked k candidates.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that for some profile A = (A 1 , . . . , A n ) and some k > 0, ℓ-GAV outputs a committee that does not provide ℓ-JR for (A, k). Then there exists a set N * ⊆ N with |N * | ≥ ℓ n k such that | i∈N * A i | ≥ ℓ and, when ℓ-GAV terminates, every ballot A i such that i ∈ N * is still in A ′ . Consider some subset of candidates {c 1 , . . . , c ℓ } ⊆ i∈N * A i . At every point in the execution of ℓ-GAV this subset is unanimously approved by at least |N * | ≥ ℓ n k ballots in A ′ . As at least one of {c 1 , . . . , c ℓ } was not elected, at every stage the algorithm selected a set of ℓ candidates that was approved by at least ℓ n k ballots (until more than k − ℓ candidates were selected). Since at the end of each stage the algorithm removed from A ′ all ballots containing the candidates that had been added to W at that stage, it follows that altogether the algorithm has removed at least ⌊ k ℓ ⌋ · ℓ n k > ( k ℓ − 1) · ℓ n k = n − ℓ n k ballots from A ′ . This is a contradiction, since we assumed that, when the algorithm terminates, the ℓ n k ballots (A i ) i∈N * are still in A ′ . ✷
Strong Justified Representation
The definition of JR requires that if there is a group of ⌈ n k ⌉ voters that all approve the same candidate, then the elected committee has to contain at least one candidate approved by some member of this group. This condition may appear to be too weak: it may seem more natural to require that the committee contains at least one candidate approved by all group members. Formally, we have the following definition.
Definition 3 (Strong justified representation (SJR)) Given a ballot profile A = (A 1 , . . . , A n ) over a candidate set C and a target committee size k, k ≤ |C|, we say that a set of candidates W , |W | = k, provides strong justified representation for (A, k) if there does not exist a set of voters N * ⊆ N with |N * | ≥ n k such that i∈N * A i = ∅, but W ∩ i∈N * A i = ∅. We say that an approval-based voting rule satisfies strong justified representation (SJR) if for every profile A = (A 1 , . . . , A n ) and every target committee size k it outputs a winning set that provides strong justified representation for (A, k).
However, it turns out that for some ballot profiles no committee provides strong justified representation.
Example 16 Let C = {a, b, c, d}, n = 4, k = 2, and consider the folowing ballot profile.
A 1 : {a, b} A 2 : {a, c} A 3 : {d, b} A 4 : {d, c}
For every candidate, there are exactly two voters who approve him, and no two voters have the same ballot. Therefore, for every committee W , |W | = 2, and every candidate x ∈ C \ W we can find two voters i, j so that A i ∩ A j = {x}.
Thus, no approval-based voting rule satisfies SJR. However, it may be interesting to identify voting rules that output a committee that provides SJR for the given ballots whenever such a committee exists.
Finally, we remark that EJR and SJR are incomparable: a committee may provide EJR without providing SJR and vice versa. One direction is established by Example 16: it is not hard to see that, e.g., {a, d} provides EJR in this example. The other direction follows from the example below.
Example 17 Let C = {a, b, c, d}, n = 4, k = 3, and consider the folowing ballot profile.
EJR requires that we choose both a and b, but {a, c, d} provides SJR.
Discussion
We have formulated a desirable property of approval-based committee selection rules, which we called justified representation (JR). While this property is fairly easy to satisfy, it turns out that many well-known approval-based rules fail it. A prominent exception is the PAV rule, which also satisfies a stronger version of this property, namely extended justified representation (EJR). Indeed, EJR characterizes PAV within the class of w-PAV rules, and we are not aware of any other natural voting rule that satisfies EJR (of course, we can construct voting rules that differ from PAV , yet satisfy EJR, by modifying the output of PAV on profiles on which EJR places no constraints on the output). Perhaps the most pressing open question suggested by our work is whether there is an efficient algorithm for finding a committee that provides EJR for a given profile. Also, it would be interesting to see if EJR, in combination with other natural axioms, can be used to axiomatize PAV . Our analysis can be extended to approval-based variants of rules that provide fully proportional representation, such as Chamberlin-Courant's rule (Chamberlin & Courant, 1983 ) and Monroe's rule (Monroe, 1995) . Specifically, under a natural adaptation of these rules to approval ballots, where the scoring function associated with each voter is identical to her ballot, Chamberlin-Courant's rule is simply (1, 0, . . . )-PAV , and hence satisfes JR, but not EJR; also, Monroe's rule can be shown to satisfy JR, but not EJR. We omit the definitions of these rules and the formal statements and proofs of the respective results, as the focus of this paper is the analysis of classic approval-based rules.
Justified representation can also be used to formulate new approval-based rules. We mention two rules that seem particularly attractive:
• Utilitarian JR (UJRAV) rule: the rule that, among all committees that satisfy JR, returns a committee with the highest AV score.
• Egalitarian JR (EJRAV) rule: the rule that, among all committees that satisfy JR, returns a committee that maximizes the number of representatives of the agent who has the least number of representatives in the winning committee.
The computational complexity of winner determination for these rules is an interesting problem. Finally, analyzing the compatibility of JR with other important properties, such as, e.g., strategyproofness for dichotomous preferences, is another avenue of future research.
